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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IN SEARCH OF BEST EFFORTS:
REINTERPRETING BLOOR V. FALSTAFF

VICTOR P. GOLDBERG*
When contracting parties cannot quite define their obligations, they often
resort to placeholder language, like “best efforts.” They (and their counsel)
likely have little idea of what they might mean, but, so long as they avoid
litigation, it will not matter much. But “best efforts” clauses are on occasion
litigated, and courts must read content into them. In Bloor v. Falstaff, a
casebook favorite,1 the court held that Falstaff’s lackluster promotional efforts
for Ballantine beer violated its best efforts covenant. So far as I can tell, no
commentators have questioned this outcome. Indeed, some commentators
have found Falstaff’s breach so egregious as to provide not much of a test of
the boundaries of “best efforts.”
Farnsworth, for example, says:
“Unfortunately, its decision did relatively little to add precision to the meaning
of ‘best efforts,’ since Kalmanovitz [of Falstaff] fell so far short of the mark.” 2
“Best efforts” can only be defined contextually. However, neither Judge
Brieant at trial3 nor Judge Friendly on appeal,4 attempted to place the contract
in its business context. Had they framed the problem properly, the outcome
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). Casebooks which reprint
it as a main case include: STEVEN J. BURTON, CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED SOURCES MATERIALS
448 (1995); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 459 (2d ed.
1989); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
623 (5th ed. 1995); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 868
(6th ed. 1996); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 254 (2d
ed. 1992); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 280 (1988).
The decision is briefly noted in the Knapp and Murray casebooks. CHARLES C. KNAPP &
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 503 (3d ed.
1993); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 260 (4th ed. 1991).
The case is cited in Murphy and Speidel, but there is no further discussion. EDWARD J. MURPHY
& RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 792 (5th ed. 1997).
2. E. A. Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984). “The opinion may seem somewhat
disappointing in that the breach was sufficiently flagrant that the court did not define ‘best efforts’
with precision.” E. A. FARNSWORTH & W. F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS—
FIFTH EDITION, MANUAL FOR TEACHERS 186-87.
3. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
4. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
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would have been different. Falstaff was not contracting to be a distributor for
another beer producer, the remarks of numerous commentators
notwithstanding.5 The fact that some of Ballantine’s compensation was
contingent upon Falstaff’s selling effort makes it appear similar to a
distribution agreement. But the purpose of the contingent compensation is
quite different and that should be taken into account when interpreting the
contract. Thus, while I am sympathetic to the Goetz-Scott argument that the
contract should be interpreted to maximize expected joint profits,6 I disagree
with their application of it to this case (which, in effect, treats the deal as if it
were a distribution arrangement).
The essential feature of the contract is that Ballantine was exiting the beer
business and was making a one-shot sale of some of its assets to Falstaff. That
purpose is crucial for understanding the role of this “best efforts” clause. The
buyer of an asset is naturally concerned about the asset’s quality. There are
numerous devices for assuring the buyer that he is not purchasing a “lemon.”7
The seller could, for example, provide extensive representations and
warranties. Or, the buyer could incur significant due diligence expenses. Or,
the seller could make a portion of its compensation contingent upon the quality
of the asset. The royalty arrangement in this transaction, essentially an
“earnout,” served precisely this role. Profits or, in this case, gross sales, serve
as a “meter,” an imperfect measure of the quality of the asset. Because an
earnout alters the buyer’s incentive structure, the seller must limit the buyer’s
ability to take advantage of the meter’s imperfections. The best efforts clause
can best be understood as an attempt to cope with that problem. The question
the court should have asked was: did Falstaff opportunistically redirect
revenues away from the meter (Ballantine’s sales)? And the facts make clear
that Falstaff did not.

5. See, e.g., J.C. Bruno, “Best Efforts” Defined, 71 MICH. B. J. 74, 76 (1992) (“Falstaff
agreed to distribute Ballantine beer, in addition to its own label, in exchange for payments to
Ballantine . . .”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L. J. 583,
608-9 (“The plaintiff signed a contract in which Falstaff, the defendant, agreed to use its ‘best
efforts’ to promote the sale of Ballantine beer (which continued to be produced by Ballantine
breweries).”); Lawrence S. Long, Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance: In Defense of “Profit Über
Alles,” 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1728, 1733 (1986) (“Falstaff would not have agreed to spend money
up front marketing Ballantine if Ballantine could later have come back and demanded a higher
royalty . . .”); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 291 (“What
changes do you think would be made in a new agreement between these two companies? Is that
relationship likely to be renewed after litigation? Was litigation necessarily the best solution
here?”).
6. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089 (1981).
7. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 262-64 (1984).
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In Part I, I summarize the facts and the two opinions. In Part II, I explore
the role of the contingent compensation in the sale of an asset and apply that
analysis to the facts of Bloor. In Part III, I speculate on how a court might
properly frame the question absent help from counsel. Even if courts choose
not to be so proactive, the implicit argument is that litigators can (and should)
frame their arguments in a more transactionally-sensitive way.
I.
A.

THE BACKGROUND

The Facts

Ballantine, a regional brewery selling low-priced beer primarily in the New
York area, was sold to Investors Funding Corporation (IFC), a real estate firm,
in 1969.8 IFC lost a considerable amount of money with Ballantine, and left
the beer business in 1972. It kept the brewery (eventually selling it for nonbeer making purposes),9 selling off the remainder of the business to Falstaff, a
larger regional brewery that had no presence in the New York market. The
parties had explored the deal for a few months but the final negotiations

8. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 263. The record of the case is available on microfiche from the
author; citations to the record will be limited to material not available in the public record.
9. They attempted, unsuccessfully, to convert the brewery into an industrial park. On Oct.
21, 1974, IFC and its wholly-owned subsidiary IFC Collateral Corporation both filed for
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. On Nov. 1, 1974, James Bloor was
appointed Trustee, replacing the Dansker management. On Dec. 23, 1980, while other suits were
still ongoing, Judge Bonsal approved a reorganization plan in which Helmsley Enterprises would
inject new money. See In re Investors Funding Corp., 8 B.R. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Other
litigation stemming from the IFC bankruptcy dragged on for over a decade. The Trustee Bloor
had taken the position that a massive fraud had been perpetrated on the Company, and he sued the
Danskers, the banks, the accountants, IFC’s outside legal counsel, various others and, of course,
Falstaff. The Trustee’s claims against the principal accountants were dismissed. See Investors
Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Claims of the Trustee against the
outside directors, IFC’s outside legal counsel and various other individuals were also dismissed.
See Investors Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d sub nom. Bloor
v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1985). Other claims of the
Trustee against IFC’s outside legal counsel were finally dismissed in 1986. See Investors
Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 635 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In addition, holders of the stock
and debentures of IFC filed five class actions against the Danskers, the accountants and the banks
which were consolidated for trial. The securities holders settled with the banks and the
accountants on March 17, 1981. See Investors Funding Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
9 B.R. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In an unrelated matter, some of IFC’s officers faced criminal
charges, stemming from the development of the George Washington Plaza shopping center. They
were charged with conspiracy to give a $100,000 bribe to Burt Ross, the Mayor of Fort Lee, New
Jersey. On March 28, 1975, former IFC officers Norman Dansker, Donald Orenstein and Stephen
Haymes were convicted of bribery. See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). They eventually served six months in jail. See Walter H.
Waggoner, Terms Cut for 4 in Ft. Lee Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, February 4, 1978, at 1.
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involved a marathon session of three days with no breaks for meals,
characterized by one of the participants as “negotiation-by-endurance.”10
Falstaff paid $4,000,000 plus a royalty of fifty cents per barrel for six years.
Ballantine’s sales in the IFC years were about 2.2 million barrels per year, well
below the 1964 peak of 4.4 million barrels.11 Had Falstaff maintained
Ballantine’s sales volume the royalty payment would have been over
$1,000,000 per year. For acquisition purposes, the rule of thumb in the beer
business at that time was to value the target at about $4 per barrel, which
would have put a value on Ballantine of about $8.5-$9 million.12 Falstaff
agreed to use “best efforts” to promote and maintain a high volume of sales
and further agreed to pay a cash sum in the event of a substantial
discontinuance of distribution under the Ballantine brand name. The terms
will be discussed in more detail below.
Falstaff’s strategy was to enter the New York market, selling beer from its
Cranston, Rhode Island brewery, under both the Ballantine and Falstaff labels.
Falstaff was a premium beer, Ballantine a low price beer, although, in fact, the
beer in the two containers was identical. Falstaff expected that buying the
Ballantine assets would help it in three ways. First, Ballantine had a trademark
that was potentially valuable, especially in the New York area. Second, it had
an existing distribution network in the New York area (it was servicing some
25,000 accounts); Falstaff would not have to assemble one to sell Ballantine
and could use that network to develop the market for Falstaff. Third,
consolidating production in the Cranston facility and closing Ballantine’s
Newark brewery, which had been operating at less than fifty percent capacity,
would increase the capacity utilization rate, thereby decreasing average
production costs.
The record is mixed as to the appropriate weighting of these components.
In his letter to the Justice Department immediately following the acquisition,
Falstaff’s outside counsel described the purpose:
You requested that I confirm Falstaff’s purpose in acquiring the Ballantine
brands and the steps which will be taken to produce and market Ballantine beer
and ale. The primary purpose of the acquisition is to utilize the excess
productive capacity of Falstaff’s seven plants.
* * *

10. Judge Brieant scolded the parties for their method, but acknowledged that “it was the
manner chosen by the parties for their own purposes, and they must each accept the
consequences . . . They should have conducted themselves in a more mature fashion. Had they
done so, at least some of the later disputes and difficulties could have been anticipated and
avoided.” Bloor, 454 F.Supp. at 276 n.11.
11. Pl.’s Ex. 9 at A1618.
12. Falstaff’s Ralph Weir’s Dep. at A1576.
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A further purpose of the acquisition (though not a major one) is that
opportunity is afforded to introduce Falstaff beer on a premium price level in
the New York metropolitan market. Any such introduction would necessarily
be low-keyed, since Falstaff does not have the resources to support any other
kind of entry into this market.13

A Falstaff internal document written at the very beginning of the process put
much more weight on using the acquisition to facilitate Falstaff’s entrance into
the New York market:
Let us further assume that, since Ballantine is a declining brand, that
Falstaff will not support and promote the brand, but, rather, cut advertising and
promotion expenses to the bone and expect a rapid decline in sales of
approximately 20% per year. Let us assume further that Falstaff uses the direct
distribution system set up by Ballantine in the 5 boroughs and Northern New
Jersey to promote Falstaff at a premium price. Since this is a large market, the
market entry costs will be high . . . . In other words, the Ballantine distribution
system will increase its distribution of Falstaff to offset the loss of volume for
Ballantine such that the plants continue to produce at the capacity level the
same as when Ballantine production was initiated.
* * *
Thus, under these assumptions, it does not seem worthwhile to purchase
Ballantine except for the entry to the N.Y. markets.14

In any event, it did not work out. Falstaff continued to promote Ballantine
at about the same level as IFC had, but sales kept falling and red ink spilling.
Falstaff claimed losses in 1972-75 of $22 million on its Ballantine operations.
In 1975, Paul Kalmanovitz acquired effective control of Falstaff and
dramatically changed its operations.15 In particular, he cut the Ballantine
advertising budget nearly 90%, cut sales personnel, and closed or phased out
four of the six distribution centers. Ballantine’s sales plummeted. Some of the
decline was attributable to the general sales decrease of regional beers, but
Ballantine’s sales fell faster than the sales of similarly situated beers.

13. Pl.’s Ex. 23 at A1677-79.
14. Falstaff internal document entitled “Opportunistic Approach to Ballantine,” Pl.’s Ex. 9 at
A1616, A1618-9, dated Sept. 1, 1971.
15. Paul Kalmanovitz arrived in America penniless in his mid-20’s and built a fortune in
beer and real estate estimated at $250 million (enough to earn him a spot on the Forbes 400 list)
at the time of his death in 1987. See Burt A. Folkart, Paul Kalmanovitz, Beer Industry Magnate,
Dies, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at 28. His treatment of Ballantine was consistent with his
treatment of the other beer labels he acquired. “Kalmanovitz’s reputation as a cost-cutter was so
dreaded that employees at Falstaff Brewing’s St. Louis headquarters flew the flag upside down
and at half-mast when they learned that [he] had taken it over in 1975. ‘He went through Falstaff
like Grant went through Richmond—he took no hostages,’ recalls [his successor].” Seth Lubove,
The Legacy of Mr. Paul, FORBES, May 1995, at 46.
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In the meantime, IFC went into bankruptcy. Bloor, the trustee in
bankruptcy for IFC, filed suit against Falstaff claiming, among other things,
that Kalmanovitz’s change of direction in 1975 violated Falstaff’s best efforts
obligation or, alternatively, amounted to a substantial discontinuance. There
were some side issues related to the fact that some of Ballantine’s pretransaction sales volume was generated by illegal marketing practices, most of
which were widespread in the industry, but the core of the dispute remained
the best efforts and substantial discontinuance questions.
B.

The Contract

Falstaff purchased the “Ballantine Assets” which were defined in the
contract.16 These included: (a) the “Proprietary Rights,” Ballantine’s brand
names, trademarks, trade names and copyrights; (b) Ballantine’s distribution
network, including contracts, orders agreements, commitments, supply and
requirements contracts, and collective bargaining agreements relating to the
sale and delivery of its malt alcoholic beverage directly to retail sellers; (c)
most of Ballantine’s accounts receivable; and (d) miscellaneous items
including the existing inventory and supplies, vehicles, cooperage, returnable
cases and bottles and similar items. Falstaff paid $4 million cash in three
installments, the last payment on the date of closing. In addition, Falstaff
would pay a royalty of fifty cents per barrel:
on the 7th day of each month, commencing May 7, 1972, and terminating
April 7, 1978 (the “Royalty Period”), a sum in cash computed at the rate of
$.50 per barrel for each barrel of 31 U.S. gallons sold by the Buyer during the
preceding calendar month under any of the Proprietary Rights, as royalties in
respect of the use of such Proprietary Rights.17

In addition, the clause included a liquidated damages clause that would
have come into effect if Falstaff substantially discontinued distribution of
Ballantine.
. . . provided, however, that if during the Royalty Period the Buyer
substantially discontinues the distribution of beer under the brand name
“Ballantine” . . . , it will pay to the Seller a cash sum equal to the years and
fraction thereof remaining in the Royalty Period times $1,100,000, payable in
equal monthly installments on the first day of each month commencing with
the first month following the month in which such discontinuation
occurs . . . .18

16. Clause 1 of the contract. The complete contract is available as Pl.’s Ex. 1 at A1584A1616. In each instance Falstaff would acquire Ballantine’s “right, title, and interest,” with the
specific items defined in separate exhibits.
17. Clause 2(a)(v).
18. Clause 2(a)(v).
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The clause at the center of the litigation, which included a rather
embarrassing typographical error, read as follows: “Certain Other Covenants
of Buyer. (a) After the Closing Date the Seller [sic!] will use its best efforts to
promote and maintain a high volume of sales under the Proprietary Rights.”19
This was not the only appearance of “best efforts” in the agreement. It
appears six other times. Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to keep
confidential non-public information about the seller.20 The seller agrees that if
any of its contracts are not assignable, it will use its best efforts to obtain
consent of third parties.21 Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to collect the
seller’s receivables (a contractually defined subset of the receivables).22 The
buyer also promises to use best efforts to collect the buyer’s receivables.23
This is not as odd as it first appears, since the seller has some financial stake in
the buyer’s receivables. Falstaff also agrees to use best efforts to retain as its
own employees Ballantine’s sales, marketing, clerical and administrative
personnel.24 The casual usage of the phrase in these varied contexts does
suggest a certain lack of care about its content.
The contract provided virtually no assurance as to the quality of the assets.
“Ballantine Assets will be sold by the seller hereunder ‘as is’ and . . . the Seller
makes no representations or warranties of any kind with respect to the
description, condition, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of
any of the Ballantine Assets.”25
At the closing Falstaff was to pay cash for 75% of Ballantine’s
receivables.26 In addition, it would pay to IFC 75% of all receivables collected
beyond that, subject to a ceiling of $7,125,000.27 There was some concern
over the receivables since in Pennsylvania it was unlawful for beer to be sold
on credit and at least one large receivable (Pflaumer) was from Pennsylvania.28
The treatment of receivables, as we shall see, turned out to have some
significance, since IFC claimed (and Judge Brieant agreed) that Falstaff’s
payment for the receivables was part of the horse-trading involving the critical
terms in the contract.

19. Clause 8(a).
20. Clause 4.
21. Clause 6(a).
22. Clause 6(b). The phrase is used twice in this context.
23. Clause 8(g).
24. Clause 8(d).
25. Clause 16. There was a limited exception for inventory, equipment, and bottles that they
would be “useable or marketable by the Seller in accordance with its customary standards, and all
finished malt alcoholic beverage products sold to the Buyer hereunder shall be produced under a
high degree of quality control.” Clause 9(f).
26. Clause 2(a)(vi).
27. Clause 2(a)(vii) and clause 2(b).
28. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 274-75. At the time of closing Pflaumer owed over $800,000. Id.
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The contract included what amounts to an acceleration clause, requiring
Falstaff to pay immediately all money due under the royalty clause in the event
of its bankruptcy.29 The language is unclear, but I believe the clause means
that the $1.1 million per year liquidated damages would be due, not the
uncertain expected value of the sum of future royalty payments. Falstaff also
agreed to pledge to IFC the proprietary rights (the trademarks) as security for
the royalty payments. If, however, such a pledge would be in violation of any
of Falstaff’s pre-existing agreements, Falstaff will “in good faith attempt to
obtain . . . any consents to such pledge which may be required; and if any
required consent is unobtainable or obtainable only upon conditions
detrimental to [Falstaff], such pledge will not be deliverable as aforesaid. In
such event, [Falstaff] will furnish [IFC] with such evidence as it may
reasonably request to ascertain the reasons therefor.”30 Falstaff agreed not to
transfer the proprietary rights during the royalty period without IFC’s written
consent.31
C. The Decisions
Trial was held without a jury.32 Falstaff argued that best efforts “must
include consideration of Falstaff’s own allegedly precarious financial position.
Plaintiff, on the contrary, cited substantial precedent holding that financial
difficulty and economic hardship do not excuse performance of a contract, and
argued for the application of an objective standard, that of the ‘average,
prudent comparable’ brewer.”33 Judge Brieant cited with approval precedent
which would not excuse performance even in the face of financial difficulty or
economic hardship.34 But he did not go this far. Falstaff did not have to spend
itself into bankruptcy to meet its contractual obligation, but it did have to meet
the prudent comparable brewer standard, “and this it failed to do.”35
Judge Brieant presented a litany of things Falstaff did (or failed to do) in
failing to meet its best efforts obligation. He cited Falstaff’s closing of four of
its retail distribution centers, including the North Bergen facility, which, he

29. Clause 2(d). “If the Buyer shall . . . file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . [or other
bankruptcy and insolvency related conditions] then each of the payments or installments provided
for in subparagraph (v) of paragraph (a) above shall immediately become forthwith due and
payable without demand or other notice of any kind.”
30. Clause 8(b). I suspect that nothing was intended by the use of “good faith” here as
opposed to “best efforts” which is scattered through the remainder of the document (including
three of the seven covenants of the buyer in clause 8).
31. Clause 8(e).
32. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 260.
33. Id. at 266.
34. Insolvency or bankruptcy does not excuse performance of a contract. While the point is
correct, it would take a large leap of logic to apply it to interpretation of the best efforts language.
35. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 267.
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said, had been losing about $2.2 million annually distributing Falstaff and
Ballantine products.36 He criticized Falstaff’s shifting from a distribution
system which sold to a large number of retail accounts, to one selling to a
small number of wholesale accounts, in particular the assignment of the New
York market to a particular distributor (Fatato) and Falstaff’s failure to accept
a different one (Molyneux).37 The judge also criticized Falstaff’s severe
“cutback of personnel in distribution, sales, marketing, administrative and
warehousing areas. It virtually eliminated its promotion and advertising of
Ballantine Beer and closed its advertising department.”38 He quoted, and
implicitly criticized, Kalmanovitz’s description of his marketing strategy:
We sell beer and you pay for it . . . . We sell beer, F. O. B. the brewery.
You come and get it.
Our responsibility is to give good product and you got responsibility to pay
for it. That’s it. That’s the substance of my arrangement. Its working.39

Falstaff had not, the court held, treated Ballantine equally. Even if they
had, the court held, that would not have been enough.
Falstaff’s relationship to Ballantine is essentially different from its relationship
to its own products. In the latter case, it may promote, continue or discontinue
its products as it wills, subject to its duty to shareholders; in the former case it
is bound by a contractual duty to the promisee. As the court said in a case
cited by the defendant here: “‘[B]est energies’ meant such effort as in the
exercise of sound judgment would be likely to produce the most profitable

36. Id.
37. In any event, after May 1976, any inability to appoint such an exclusive distributor in
the New York area was caused by the fault or negligence of Falstaff. To the extent such
fault or negligence prevented it from using effective marketing methods in the area which
Molyneux proposed to serve, it is answerable in damages to Ballantine.
* * *
Mr. Kalmanovitz as a traditional businessman expressed at trial his contempt for
‘studies’ and ‘projections.’ Consequently, in making the decisions to close the North
Bergen facility and to appoint Mr. Fatato distributor in the New York City area, no effort
was made to ascertain in advance the effect on Ballantine sales . . . . Falstaff was willing
to appoint a distributor for the area, Mr. Fatato, about whose abilities the President of
Falstaff had serious reservations, and to continue him in a virtual monopoly of Falstaff
products in the area despite Mr. Molyneux’s proposals. These actions exceed any
reasonable variance allowable in the exercise of sound business judgment. No effort was
made by Falstaff to examine or find alternatives to the drastic step of closing the North
Bergen facility, although it accounted for a very large percentage of Ballantine sales.
Id. at 269.
38. Id. at 270. Note that if this violated the best efforts obligation to sell Ballantine it likely
would have also violated the best efforts obligation to keep employed the Ballantine personnel.
Id. at 269.
39. Bloor, 454 F.Supp at 270.
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results to the promisee in view of the nature of the business and the extent of
the territory over which it was to be conducted.” 40

Moreover, he suggested, Falstaff’s incentives favored promoting Falstaff at
the expense of Ballantine.
Some of this apparent callousness towards Ballantine sales is undoubtedly
caused by the fact that even though the liquid in a can of Ballantine Beer and
in a can of Falstaff Beer is identical, and accordingly costs exactly the same
amount to produce, sale of Falstaff Beer produces a greater profit for Falstaff.
In part this is the result of the fact that Falstaff is a “premium” beer and nets
Falstaff about $4.20 more a barrel than does Ballantine, even before the $.50
Ballantine royalty is subtracted from the latter.41

Judge Brieant did side with Falstaff in rejecting Bloor’s claim that
Falstaff’s behavior amounted to substantial discontinuance of Ballantine.
Falstaff had continued to distribute beer under the Ballantine name and had
introduced Ballantine in other markets. Ballantine’s sales had dropped
dramatically. However:
[a] very significant part of this decline is attributable . . . to the general decline
of the market share of the smaller brewers, and to other causes unconnected
with Falstaff’s closing of the North Bergen facility. The remaining decline is
regarded as “insubstantial” under the contract. It is clear from the royalty rate
established in the contract itself that the liquidated damages clause was
included to cover situations approaching the total cessation of Ballantine
production, rather than situations involving gradual but significant declines in
sales.42

Damages were calculated by subtracting Ballantine’s actual sales from the
sales that would have been made had Falstaff used its best efforts (as
determined by the court).43 The court accepted the expert witness’s estimate,
which was based on the assumption that Ballantine’s sales would have
followed the same trend as two other small New York labels, Schaefer and
Rheingold. After some modest deductions, primarily to exclude Ballantine
sales that were the product of illegal activities, the judge concluded that the
royalties lost by Ballantine were approximately $630,000. Falstaff had
withheld royalties during the litigation and these too were awarded, bringing
the final judgment to about $1.3 million.44
Falstaff appealed the best efforts ruling and Bloor appealed the rejection of
the substantial discontinuance claim. Judge Friendly, speaking for a

40.
1912)).
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 270-71 (quoting Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 99 N.E. 221, 226 (Mass.
Id. at 269-70.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 280.
Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 281.
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unanimous court, affirmed. He restated Judge Brieant’s conclusion, softening
it a bit. Brieant’s decision might have been interpreted as requiring Falstaff to
continue promoting Ballantine regardless of the financial consequences.
Friendly made clear, however, that “best efforts” did not mean that Falstaff
must go to these lengths. But it did have a special duty to promote Ballantine
beer sales.
While [the best efforts] clause clearly required Falstaff to treat the Ballantine
brands as well as its own, it does not follow that it required no more. With
respect to its own brands, management was entirely free to exercise its
business judgment as to how to maximize profit even if this meant serious loss
in volume. Because of the obligation it had assumed under the sales contract,
its situation with respect to the Ballantine brands was quite different. The
royalty of $.50 a barrel on sales was an essential part of the purchase price.
Even without the best efforts clause Falstaff would have been bound to make a
good faith effort to see that substantial sales of Ballantine products were made,
unless it discontinued under clause 2(a)(v) with consequent liability for
liquidated damages . . . . Clause 8 imposed an added obligation to use “best
efforts to promote and maintain a high volume of sales . . . .” (emphasis
supplied). Although we agree that even this did not require Falstaff to spend
itself into bankruptcy to promote the sales of Ballantine products, it did
prevent the application to them of Kalmanovitz’ philosophy of emphasizing
profit über alles without fair consideration of the effect on Ballantine volume.
Plaintiff was not obliged to show just what steps Falstaff could reasonably
have taken to maintain a high volume for Ballantine products. It was sufficient
to show that Falstaff simply didn’t care about Ballantine’s volume and was
content to allow this to plummet so long as that course was best for Falstaff’s
overall profit picture, an inference which the judge permissibly drew. The
burden then shifted to Falstaff to prove there was nothing significant it could
have done to promote Ballantine sales that would not have been financially
disastrous.45

II. THE DEAL
Judges Friendly and Brieant take it as axiomatic that the contract required
Falstaff to trade off its profits for Ballantine’s sales. Conspicuous by its
absence in their decisions is any analysis of why the contract included the
royalty arrangement and the best efforts covenant. That is not entirely the fault
of the judges, as the record was completely silent on this point. So, we are left
with the somewhat peculiar spectacle of a court giving meaning to a contextsensitive phrase with no guidance as to the context. The context dictates how
“best efforts” should have been interpreted. Had the court recognized that the
royalty was, in effect, an “earnout,” ancillary to the one-shot sale of some of

45. Bloor, 601 F.2d at 614-15.
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Ballantine’s assets to Falstaff, the outcome would have (or, at least, should
have) been different.
An earnout makes part of the payment for an asset contingent upon some
measure of future performance. Often it is a function of profits; here, it is a
function of sales. Most corporate acquisitions do not involve earnouts. In
1998, of the over 9,000 acquisitions, only 153 included an earnout.46 They
would make little sense in the sale of a public corporation with numerous
shareholders and where the seller ceases to exist as an entity. Here, where the
seller is a private entity, which survives the transaction, it is more likely that
the parties would choose to use an earnout. Earnouts rarely show up in
appellate litigation; a Lexis search found only forty-two cases.47 That might
not adequately indicate the frequency with which they generate disputes. I
suspect, based in part on my consulting experience, that the disputes are far
more common, but that they arise in arbitrations, not litigation.48
IFC was, essentially, selling two assets—Ballantine’s brand name (the
proprietary rights) and its distribution network. IFC’s purpose was simple; it
wanted to sell at the highest price. That should be obvious, but the court’s
failure to recognize this basic point is the core of the problem. Falstaff
purchased the proprietary rights in order to exploit them efficiently. By
maintaining the flexibility to respond to new information as it appears, Falstaff
increases the amount it would be willing to pay Ballantine for the right to
exploit the brand name. Other things equal, the fewer post-sale restrictions on
Falstaff’s exploitation of the assets, the more Falstaff would be willing to pay.
Falstaff’s pursuit of “profit über alles,” ex post, redounds to IFC’s benefit, ex
ante. So, any restriction, like the best efforts clause, immediately raises a red
flag: how might the particular restriction raise the value of the Ballantine
assets, ex ante?
A.

The Earnout

Falstaff could have purchased the Ballantine assets outright rather than
spreading the compensation over six years and making the payment contingent
upon Ballantine sales. Why did they choose the latter course? There are three
plausible reasons for using an earnout: (1) the seller is also filling the role of
financier; (2) the seller is providing a bond for a promise not to engage in postsale activities that would adversely affect the value of the assets to the buyer;

46. For the number of deals, see 1998 M&A Profile, 33 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 42
(1999). For the number including earnouts, see Deal Structuring: Earn-Outs Get Into More
Deals, 33 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 35 (1999).
47. Lexis search, January 10, 2000.
48. In the last year I was involved, briefly, as a potential expert witness in two arbitrations
concerning the interpretation of an earnout clause. On earnouts, see generally Mark D. Gerstein,
Earnouts: An Outline of Key Issues, 1059 PLI/CORP 763 (1998).
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and (3) the parties are responding to the information asymmetry. In this
instance, the third is most plausible.
Ballantine was, in effect, making a six-year loan to Falstaff. The security
arrangements and acceleration clause discussed above49 are manifestations of
this. A loan would make sense only if Falstaff could get terms at least as
favorable from IFC as from alternative sources.50 If restrictions in its existing
capital structure—debt covenants and the like—constrained Falstaff, spreading
the payments over time might have been a simple way of financing the
transaction without violating the constraints.51 A Falstaff planning document
entitled “Ballantine Observations” hinted at some of the financing
considerations:
6. Falstaff’s financing of this purchase —What form would it take—would it
take external financing, stock issue, additional long-term debt, what is the
availability of any of the forms of financing and what would it cost and
what restrictions would it place upon our operations.
5. The present debt agreements
a.

Do they allow this type of acquisition and when must these
insurance companies be notified that we are considering such
action.

6. The stockholder approval—What would be the mechanics here—what is
the timing of such notification and what are the consequences of our
announcing such to the stockholders in light of our present earnings
situation and that of the last few years.52

While spreading the payments over time might be a perfectly sensible way to
finance the project, financing considerations cannot explain why the payments
were contingent upon Ballantine sales. Something more is necessary to
explain why IFC in its role as financier would choose to take neither a fixed
return nor an equity position in Falstaff.
Earnouts are sometimes used to discourage the seller’s management from
engaging in post-sale actions detrimental to the buyer. Ballantine’s managers
would provide a bond to Falstaff to assure that they would not by their future
actions reduce the value of the Ballantine trademark. Suppose that the top
management of Ballantine had developed some good will with the beer market.
The value of the brand name they were selling would be impaired if they could

49. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
50. If the costs of litigation are high, spreading the payments over time would give Falstaff
some leverage to bargain down its future obligations. Deferral changes the status quo for
subsequent litigation.
51. It is always possible that the structure of a transaction reflects tax consequences; I do not
know of any in this instance and the record gave no indication of any.
52. Pl.’s Ex. 14 at A1624-25, dated Jan. 8, 1972.
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subsequently re-enter and compete against Ballantine. A promise not to
compete would, if enforceable, make the Ballantine assets more valuable.
Giving these managers an interest in Ballantine’s future sales or profits could
substitute for, or complement, the non-compete covenant. The problem with
this explanation, of course, is that the outgoing Ballantine executives had no
competence in the beer industry53 or expectation of staying in the beer
industry; and Falstaff knew it. A promise not to compete, or any variant
thereon, would have been worthless.
The earnout was a response to the problem of asymmetric information. In
sales of complex assets the seller typically has more information than the
prospective buyer.54 If buyers cannot distinguish good assets from bad, then
they are likely to be suspicious of any particular asset and to reduce their offer
price accordingly. If the seller believes his asset to be sound, then conveying
that information to the buyer can result in a higher net price. The parties have
an incentive to economize on the joint production of information. By
accepting some of its compensation in a contingent form, the seller provides
some assurance to the buyer of the quality of the asset. Instead of insisting
upon elaborate representations and warranties or engaging in extensive due
diligence, Falstaff bought the Ballantine assets “as is” with over half the
expected cost contingent upon future sales.
The parties want an arrangement which maximizes the value to the buyer
ex ante. But producing information and assurance is not costless. The process
of maximizing the value of the asset can reduce the size of the joint pie. That
would obviously be true if the parties had spent months negotiating elaborate
representations and warranties and/or engaging in a due diligence
investigation. In this instance the parties avoided these costs using the royalty
payment instead. It, too, is not costless. Earnouts, generally, have a number of
value-reducing features. They do not track value perfectly; they can distort
53. Judge Brieant accurately characterized IFC’s competence in the beer business:
Mr. Donald Orenstein was Executive Vice-President of Investors Funding Corporation
and of P. Ballantine & Sons at the time the negotiations with Falstaff took place. He
testified at trial to the IFC management’s complete lack of experience in the brewing
industry. His own career began with IFC as a clerk, and ultimately he became President of
IFC Realty Service. He stated at trial his views on IFC’s acquisition of Ballantine (Tr. p.
124): “Q. When did it become apparent to you that Investors Funding should sell P.
Ballantine & Company? A. The second day that I arrived at P. Ballantine, in ‘69. He (Mr.
Jerome Dansker, Chairman of the Board of IFC) bought it on a Thursday; I told him
Friday to sell it.”
Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 263 n.6.
54. See Victor P. Goldberg, The Gold Ring Problem, 47 U. TORONTO L. J. 469 (1997). The
article analyzes the case in which the buyer might have superior information. Ballantine had
superior information about the quality of its assets, but Falstaff had superior information about its
plans on how to use those assets. Contingent compensation allows the seller to capture some of
the gains despite its relative ignorance about the buyer’s plans. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

IN SEARCH OF BEST EFFORTS

1479

incentives; and they are not strategy-proof—that is, the buyer can operate the
business in a way that exploits the mechanism. For example, if an earnout
were based on profits in the first three years, the buyer could make investment
decisions which shift profits from the third to the fourth year. Anticipation of
these costs will reduce the final price of the asset. If the best efforts clause
means anything,55 its role would be to prevent the buyer from taking undue
advantage of the earnout.
Falstaff bought the Ballantine trademarks in order to exploit them. As
Falstaff’s CEO at the time of the transaction, Robert Colson, testified:
The intention when we went into this deal was to use our best efforts, and
that’s exactly what it says there. We were going to go out and do our best
efforts to promote the brand, or why would we have bought the brand? You
don’t buy something with the intention that you’re going to abandon it. If you
did, then you spend a lot of time wasting your time.56

Conceivably, Falstaff could have bought the Ballantine brand name with the
intention of eliminating Ballantine as a competitor. Since Falstaff was not in
the New York market and the two beers were targeted at different customers,
this would not have been a concern of the parties. However, during the life of
the earnout, Falstaff could have combined with another brewer with a
significant presence in the New York market; the best efforts clause could be
viewed as protecting against that contingency.
The royalty acts as a tax (roughly 2%)57 on sales, which could induce
Falstaff to market a somewhat smaller amount of Ballantine product than it
would have, but for the royalty. So “best efforts” might possibly mean that
Falstaff should push its sales effort a bit beyond the point that would otherwise
be optimal. The distortion of incentives, which in this instance is quite minor,
is a common problem in contingent compensation arrangements (franchise
fees, percentage leases, oil and gas royalties, and so forth) and “best efforts” is
just one of the devices for dealing with the problem.
The more likely function was to police diversion. Falstaff bought two sets
of assets: the proprietary rights and the distribution network. But the earnout
was related only to the value of the former. Ballantine’s owners had some
reason for concern on this score. Falstaff was, after all, attempting to break
into the New York market to sell its own brand and Ballantine’s owners were
aware of this prospect.58 Had Falstaff simply jettisoned the Ballantine brand
55. The liberal use of the term in the contract suggests that it was little more than filler.
56. Colson’s Test. at 1099.
57. Ballantine’s 1970 price was $26.60 per barrel and the royalty rate was fifty cents per
barrel. Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 1618.
58. On Falstaff’s interest in the distribution network, see supra note 14 and accompanying
text. On Ballantine’s awareness, see the testimony of Melvin Carro, of Falstaff: “There was an
expression of concern stated by somebody on the Ballantine side that possibly Falstaff would use
the Ballantine distribution system to come into the New York area, and then for reasons of its
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entirely and used the distribution network to distribute Falstaff beer instead,
Falstaff would not simply be maximizing the value of the asset (the distribution
network)—it would be diverting payment for that asset. The royalty
arrangement would fail completely in its purpose.59 More generally, to the
extent that Falstaff could use the distribution network to sell Falstaff rather
than Ballantine, the royalty would not track the value of the asset.
A “best efforts” requirement is one contractual device for protecting
against this sort of diversion. But the context suggests how the clause should
be read. “Best efforts” in this context means that Falstaff agreed that in its
pursuit of “profit über alles” it would not opportunistically divert sales from
Ballantine (the sales of which were to track asset value) to Falstaff. Did
Falstaff use the network to divert more sales than the parties should reasonably
have expected? That might be a difficult question to answer for some fact
patterns, but for the facts of this case the answer is easy and negative. When
Kalmanovitz took charge he dismantled the distribution system. The evidence
Judge Brieant relied on to document what he believed to be Falstaff’s lack of
best efforts supports the conclusion that Falstaff did not exploit a loophole in
the earnout. Falstaff did not divert resources to the more profitable brand; it
simply terminated (or at least drastically pared) a project that did not work.
So, we are left with three plausible meanings of “best efforts” in the
context of this transaction. First, it could be aimed at preventing Falstaff from
abandoning the brand following a merger with a brewer with a significant
presence in the New York market. Second, it might have been an attempt to
correct Falstaff’s incentives, which were a bit distorted by the royalty “tax.”
Third, and the most plausible, it could have been an attempt to limit diversion
of revenue away from the device chosen to provide assurance of that value.
None provides a basis for concluding that Falstaff’s pursuit of profit über alles,
by revising its Ballantine marketing strategy and dismantling much of the
Ballantine distribution network, violated its obligation to Ballantine.
This is a simple and, I believe, compelling story. There is only one
problem with it. It is not the story told by the witnesses or counsel. That does
not make it wrong; but it does raise the questions of how courts are supposed
to figure it out and, if they do, what they should do about it. That problem is
compounded by the “substantial discontinuance” proviso, which can be
explained, but the explanation is neither so simple nor compelling. After

own, it might be possible . . . that Falstaff would concentrate on the sales of Falstaff, and either
abandon or let the Ballantine beer sales diminish.” Carro’s Test. at A1074-75.
59. For completeness, we can identify another diversion possibility. Instead of selling
Ballantine beer under the proprietary rights, Falstaff might have sold Ballantine pretzels or
clothing or some other non-beer trademarked articles. They did not, so I need not pursue the
matter further here.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

IN SEARCH OF BEST EFFORTS

1481

attempting to make some sense of the proviso, I will return to the problem of
decision-making by an ill-informed court.
B.

Substantial Discontinuance

It is common to couple royalty payment schemes with minimum payment
obligations.
Such arrangements are common in publishing and movies (talent receive
royalties or a percentage of the gross to be offset against a bargained for fixed
fee),60 licensing agreements, franchising, shopping center and other retail
leases, and so forth. It is tempting to assume that such arrangements would
make sense in the sale of an asset, as in the present case. Indeed, my initial
presumption was that the “substantial discontinuance” clause was a poorly
drafted attempt to create a minimum obligation. However, I was wrong. The
minimum does not add anything useful for the sale of an asset where the seller,
like Ballantine, has no interest in, or affect upon, the outcomes other than the
receipt of its compensation.
Up to the minimum, the effective tax rate is zero. Incentives still are
distorted at the margin, but a high minimum means that at least over a broad
range, the buyer’s incentives are not distorted. But the higher the minimum,
the weaker the quality assurance provided by the royalty. A high minimum
undercuts the quality assurance function since the purchaser must pay
regardless of quality. So, while a minimum annual payment might help correct
the tax distortion of the per barrel royalty, it does so only by undercutting the
purpose.
A minimum guarantee might conceivably be of a bit more use in policing
diversion. If the parties were indeed concerned with the possibility that
Falstaff would use the Ballantine distribution network to distribute Falstaff
beer, a minimum obligation would have imposed a sharp limit on Falstaff’s
ability to do so. But if the advantage of distributing Falstaff were substantial
(recall Judge Brieant’s claim that in addition to the fifty cents per barrel
royalty, the identical beer sold for $4.50 more per barrel when labeled
Falstaff),61 then Falstaff would have had a strong incentive to treat the
minimum as a target. The royalty would serve no particular function.

60. On publishing contracts, see Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of
Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON. 27, 34-35 (1982); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, HandsTying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 628 (1992). On gross profits compensation in movies, see Victor Goldberg, The Net
Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 546-49.
61. A price differential of around 20% is not trivial. However, we should recognize that
brewers engage in a form of (legal) price discrimination by targeting different groups with beers
priced accordingly. There is no reason to believe that Falstaff could sell its brand to the “price
beer” market reached by the Ballantine brand and maintain the price differential.
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Ballantine asked for a minimum guarantee, but Falstaff refused.
Ballantine’s Orenstein testified:
Falstaff was never willing to give us a guarantee of a million one. They said
they would use their best efforts . . . they didn’t give us really, what we
wanted. We wanted a million one guarantee, that if for any reason the sales
dropped below fifty cents a barrel times two million two . . . we would be
guaranteed at least, a million one, and that’s not in the contract.
Q. It did not get in there?
A. No. We traded that off. It did not get in there.62

Although the contract did not include a minimum guarantee, it did include
liquidated damages of $1.1 million per year (the same amount Ballantine had
been asking as the minimum) in the event of Falstaff’s substantial
discontinuance of Ballantine. If this proviso were included as part of the
quality assurance mechanism, as I first thought, it makes no sense. In effect, it
says: if the assets are really terrible so that they are unusable, then Falstaff pays
Ballantine $1.1 million per year for the duration; if on the other hand, they are
only pretty bad, Falstaff pays less. That is a perverse result, which I thought,
could only be explained by poor drafting.
However, the clause makes more sense if it is viewed as being independent
of the quality of the proprietary rights and instead concerns diversion of
revenues from the exploitation of Ballantine’s distribution network. Falstaff
says, in effect: we agree that we will not cheat you by diverting receipts from
the metering device (Ballantine sales) and profiting by the use of the other
valuable asset we have purchased, your distribution network; if we have done
too much diversion, we agree to pay a penalty (although the law does not
permit us to call it that).63 The trigger for the penalty would not be the quantity
of Ballantine sold nationally. Rather, it would be the percentage of Ballantine
being sold through the old Ballantine network.
But this mechanism had one big hole. What if the network itself turned out
to be of little or no value? Falstaff essentially abandoned the network, but
continued to exploit the proprietary rights as best it could. If the proviso’s
purpose was to thwart massive diversion of revenues, there was no diversion.
62. Orenstein’s Dep. at A1465-66. Falstaff’s attorney made the same point:
During the negotiations, P. Ballantine & Sons attempted to elicit from Falstaff a guarantee
as to the minimum royalty that would be paid to Ballantine, and Falstaff staunchly
resisted any effort to force a minimum payment of royalties, and so the contract read that
there would be only best efforts required of Falstaff Brewing Corporation.
Falstaff Att’y at A60.
63. Falstaff’s Reply Brief raised, somewhat half-heartedly, the possibility that the proviso
might be a penalty clause: “[A] construction of the proviso that would give it effect in any
circumstances other than the near total cessation of Ballantine production would make of it, not a
liquidated damages provision, but an unenforceable penalty clause.” Falstaff’s Reply Br. at 37.
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Falstaff bore the direct risk of the distribution network being a lemon; it seems
unlikely that ex ante the parties would have wanted Falstaff to post an
additional bond against that prospect. But, and this must be emphasized, it is
most likely that neither party expected the distribution network to be worth so
little, and the contract reflected their failure to anticipate this possibility.
III. SO, WHAT’S A POOR COURT TO DO?
The parties did not give the court much assistance in framing the case.
This is, I believe, less a matter of the peculiar way in which facts percolate up
through the judicial system than of genuine confusion. Orenstein’s testimony
on the origins of the controversial terms is indicative:
In substance what happened is that we just couldn’t get together on those three
items. It was the accounts receivables, the best efforts, and . . . the words
substantial discontinuance. What does that really mean? How does one
determine that? Can’t we put in a formula? No, we won’t give you a formula;
we don’t want to attach ourselves to anything. That’s Colson’s exact words.
We told him, How can we make a deal not knowing where we’re going? He
said, Well, you have to believe that we’re experts in the beer business for so
many years; you’re not selling to us just to collect a million one, you’re going
to look to us to collect much more, and we’ll be able to increase the sales.
I said, Well, if that’s the way you feel, why don’t you write it? He said,
No, he’s not prepared to do that. They have certain standards under which
they do deals, and that’s one of them. They didn’t want to put it in writing, but
that’s how we came to the receivable. I said, If that’s the feeling, give me
something. Take my receivables. He said, Maybe we’ll do that. That’s how
the next dialogue started. They then recessed. . . .
I told [my colleagues] that the substantial discontinuance thing bothers me.
What does that mean? Should we put in a percentage? Do you think we
should try for a percentage? Then we all collectively said, in our minds, 30
percent would be considered a substantial discontinuance. I went back and
mentioned that figure and they laughed. There was no way they would do it.64

Ballantine’s lawyers asked various witnesses what best efforts meant to
them and whether it meant more than good faith, a sterile inquiry designed to
wrench damning statements out of the mouths of unwary witnesses. But
neither side ever framed the question in terms of the underlying purpose of the
transaction: sale of an asset of uncertain value. Counsel never even hinted at
the possibility that the dismantling of the Ballantine distribution network
should count in favor of Falstaff, instead of counting against it. The courts
accepted the parties’ terms of debate.

64. Otenstein’s Test. at A1473-74.
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This was not inevitable; a court with a confident understanding of what the
deal was about could easily have framed the best efforts question properly and
disposed of it cleanly. From the contractual context, the plausible meanings of
best efforts were narrowly circumscribed and under both those meanings,
Falstaff had satisfied its obligation. The substantial discontinuance proviso
presents a more difficult problem. Still, the most plausible explanation
concerns the diversion of the revenue from the Ballantine distribution network;
given the purpose of the transaction, we might reasonably infer that shutting
down that network completely would not constitute a substantial
discontinuance.
I am not suggesting that courts should ignore contract language and
attempt to determine the parties’ true intent. Rather, I am suggesting that when
contract language is context sensitive, the court should use that context in
interpreting the contract. The emphasis should not be on what these parties
meant, but on what reasonable people in this situation should have meant. So,
even if Orenstein’s testimony regarding the origins of the substantial
discontinuance was accurate and the best efforts language was lifted from a
form book with the parties giving it no mind, that should not matter in
interpreting the agreement. We ought not, in Judge Easterbrook’s colorful
phrase, invite “a tour through Walters’ cranium with Walters as the guide.”65
The starting point should be this: a rational seller would not want the buyer
to promise to use the asset sub-optimally. It makes little sense to have an
interpretative strategy that presumed such an irrational policy.
An
interpretation of a contract that begins with the presumption that the seller
intended to restrict the buyer’s subsequent use of the asset, is bound to fail
unless there is an understanding of the possible gains from tying the buyer’s
hands.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Generally speaking, giving content to an amorphous concept like “best
efforts” is extremely difficult. Even in this contract, in which “best efforts”
was invoked seven times and “good faith” once, it is hard to determine how a
court should respond to claims that particular best efforts obligations had not
been met. How, for example, should one deal with a complaint that Falstaff
had failed to meet its best efforts obligation to maintain as its own employees
Ballantine’s sales, marketing, clerical and administrative personnel?
Ironically, while the problem is generally difficult or intractable, in the one
case that has filtered down to the casebook level, the problem turns out to be
an easy one. The context—a one-shot sale of assets—delimits the feasible

65. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).
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meanings of “best efforts” and both of the meanings lead to the same
conclusion: the courts got it wrong.
Again, I must emphasize, I am not asking courts to ferret out the true intent
of the parties. People do often enter into foolish deals and it would be
disastrous for courts to continually second-guess their choices. But where the
language is inherently ambiguous, the court should not impose an irrational
agreement upon the parties. The peculiar feature of Bloor is that the way the
controversy was framed made the irrational seem natural to the litigators, the
courts and the commentators. When the irrational seems natural it is time to
re-think how we got there and to seek a better alternative.
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